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 On September 14, 2004, brothers Seneca and Tari Adams endured 
vicious beatings by Chicago police officers outside of their home.1 
Seneca Adams was initially stopped by Chicago police officers while 
jogging through his apartment complex.2 His neighbors looked on as 
he was kicked, handcuffed, and punched in the face.3 Later, he was 
driven to a secluded area where an officer continued to beat him.4 
Having realized that the police car was driving in the opposite 
direction of the police station, Seneca’s brother, Tari, followed the 
vehicle.5 He too was beaten and handcuffed.6 The brothers were found 
                                                 
∗ J.D. candidate, May 2017, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology. 
1 Adams v. City of Chicago, 798 F.3d 539, 541 (7th Cir. 2015). 
2 Adams v. City of Chicago, 62 F. Supp. 3d 771, 773-74 (N.D. Ill. 2014), 
vacated and remanded, 798 F.3d 539 (7th Cir. 2015). 
3 Adams, 62 F. Supp. 3d at 773-74. 
4 Id. 
5 Id. at 774. 
6 Id. at 775. 
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guilty of misdemeanors and remained in custody at the Cook County 
Jail for 204, and 46 days, respectively.7  
In 2006, the brothers sued.8 The City of Chicago admitted liability 
as to false arrest, use of excessive force, discrimination on the basis of 
race, and malicious prosecution.9 Although the jury awarded Seneca 
and Tari compensatory damages at trial, the brothers were denied the 
actual amount of damages that the jury intended.10 Through a 
procedure called “remittitur,” the trial judge’s determination that the 
damages amounts were “grossly excessive” caused the award to be 
reduced by over half.11 The brothers never agreed to the reduction in 
damages and were not offered the option of a new trial.12 Under these 
circumstances, the brothers were denied justice. Years later in 2015, 
the trial judge’s order of remittitur was vacated by the Seventh Circuit 
in Adams v. City of Chicago.13 
The Adams’ story is one of many instances of brutality and 
targeting of minorities by law enforcement officers. This nation is 
currently engaged in vigorous discussion about whether the courts 
may be seen as a true avenue for justice in police brutality cases. Over 
the last few years, failure to prosecute law enforcement officers for 
racially motivated violence has caused public outcry. However, the 
lesser-known procedural obstacle of remittitur has become a vehicle 
through which civil rights plaintiffs may be denied fairness in court.  
In some cases, even where liability is admitted as to racially-
targeted policing, a court may significantly reduce the amount of 
damages awarded by a jury to victims of police brutality. Although the 
Seventh Amendment provides that “no fact tried by a jury, shall be 
otherwise reexamined in any court of the United States,”14 courts have 
                                                 
7 Id. 
8 Id. at 776. 
9 Id. at 776-77. 
10 Adams, 798 F.3d at 541. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. at 546. 
14 U.S. CONST. amend. VII. 
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insisted that remittitur is applied only where a jury verdict is excessive 
as a matter of law. This distinction is tenuous in a civil rights context. 
Damages awarded by a jury to compensate for pain and suffering or 
emotional distress involve a subjective determination of fact. Due to 
the nature of such damages, the trial judge’s conclusion that a damages 
award is excessive will necessarily involve some reexamination of 
fact. Thus, this paper argues that in civil rights cases, the judge has no 
constitutional or public policy basis for supplanting the jury’s 
determination with a subjective conclusion about damages of his or 
her own. 
Further, although a “true remittitur” must be accompanied by the 
alternative option of submitting the case to a new trial, recent 
scholarship suggests that this option is illusory due to the increased 
cost, delay, and risk associated with a new trial.15 While the Seventh 
Circuit reinstated the jury damages in the Adams brothers’ case, it 
failed to take seriously the brothers’ argument that even a “true” order 
of remittitur violates the plaintiff’s rights under the Seventh 
Amendment.16 Through an analysis of the trial option and the process 
by which a judge determines that a jury award is excessive in civil 
cases, this paper argues that the practice of remittitur serves no 
constitutional or public policy interest when a plaintiff sues for 
violation of his or her civil rights. 
 
REMITTITUR IN FEDERAL JURISPRUDENCE 
 
A.  What is Remittitur? 
 
Remittitur is defined as “the procedure by which a trial judge 
gives a plaintiff who has received an excessively favorable jury verdict 
the option of accepting a specified reduction in the jury verdict or 
                                                 
15 See Suja A. Thomas, Re-Examining the Constitutionality of Remittitur Under 
the Seventh Amendment, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 731 (2003). 
16 Adams, 798 F.3d at 546. 
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submitting to a new trial.”17 An order for remittitur most often occurs 
after a losing defendant moves for a new trial on the ground that the 
damages awarded by the jury were excessive.18 Thus, the first step is 
an initial determination by the trial judge that the jury verdict was 
excessive.19 On this question, jurisdictions have adopted differing 
standards, resulting in confusion and lack of uniformity.20  
If the judge concludes that the jury verdict is excessive, he or she 
may enter an order for remittitur that entitles the defendant to a new 
trial only if the plaintiff refuses to accept a reduction in the jury 
verdict.21 A “true remittitur” is always accompanied by the alternative 
option of a submitting the case to a new trial.22 Specifically in a civil 
rights context, there are few clear guidelines as to deciding how much 
a jury verdict should be remitted. “There are no standard awards for 
items such as pain and suffering or damage to reputation, and in 
determining the amount to be remitted, the trial judge must adhere to 
the vague standards required by the court of appeals for his circuit.”23 
Most circuits employ a “reasonable jury” standard that seeks to 
determine the amount that would have been awarded by a reasonable 
jury.24 In making such a determination, the trial judge must balance the 
interests of the plaintiff, the interests of the defendant, public policy 
arguments, and constitutional law under the Seventh Amendment.25 
If a plaintiff accepts the reduction in his or her damages, final 
judgment is entered on the reduced amount.26 In this circumstance, 
                                                 
17 Irene Sann, Remittitur Practice in the Federal Courts, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 




20 Id. at 303. 
21 Id. at 304. 
22 Dimick v. Scheidt, 293 U.S. 474, 482-83 (1934). 
23 Sann, supra note 18, at 307. 
24 Id.at 307. 
25 Id. at 309, 312. 
26 Id. at 311. 
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although a defendant may appeal the trial court’s judgment, a plaintiff 
has “traditionally been precluded from appeal on the theory that, by 
choice, he has acquiesced in the final judgment on remittitur.”27 If the 
plaintiff chooses the alternative option of submitting to a new trial, he 
or she must wait until final judgment has been entered on the second 
trial before obtaining the right to appeal.28 However, the judicial 
system does not look favorably upon plaintiffs who refuse to remit.29 
As explained by Irene Johnson in her 1976 article “Remittitur Practice 
in Federal Courts”:  
 
[A]ppellate courts… seem quite hostile to plaintiffs who 
refuse to remit. A court will hold that a remittitur from, for 
example, $50,000 to $30,000 was not an abuse of discretion 
since a reasonable jury might find that amount. In the next 
breath the appellate court will decide that it was not an abuse 
of discretion for the judge at the second trial to affirm a 
verdict of $5,000 and deny plaintiff's motion for a new trial.30 
 
 Thus, in most cases remittitur presents a no-win situation for 
plaintiffs. As discussed infra, a lack of clear and uniform standards for 
determining that a jury verdict is excessive, accompanied by the 
illusoriness of the option for a new trial, cause an order for remittitur 
to coerce a plaintiff into accepting reduced damages, even in situations 
where a reasonable jury might have awarded the initial amount. 
 
B.  History of Remittitur in Federal Courts 
 
The Seventh Amendment provides that “[i]n suits at common law, 
where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of 
trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be 
otherwise reexamined in any court of the United States, than according 
                                                 
27 Id. 
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to the rules of the common law.”31 The United States Supreme Court 
has never directly addressed the question of whether remittitur violates 
the Seventh Amendment. However, dicta found in the 1935 case 
Dimick v. Scheidt, combined with long-term practice of remittitur in 
federal courts, has allowed the procedure to occur largely without 
question.32 
In Dimick, the Court considered the constitutionality of additur, a 
procedure by which the trial judge increases the size of the jury 
award.33 Parallels between additur and remittitur caused the Court to 
also discuss the constitutionality of remittitur against the Seventh 
Amendment.34 The action in that case involved negligent operation of 
an automobile on a public highway.35 At trial, the jury awarded the 
respondent $500 in damages.36 The respondent moved for a new trial 
on the grounds that the damages were inadequate.37 In response, the 
trial court conditioned a new trial upon the petitioner’s refusal to 
consent to an increase of the damages to $1,500.38 The petitioner 
consented to the increase and the respondent’s motion was denied.39 
The respondent appealed, and the court of appeals reversed the 
judgment, holding that that the trial court’s order violated the 
petitioner’s Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial.40 The Supreme 
Court granted certiorari in order to determine whether an order of 
additur, which conditions a new trial upon a party’s refusal to consent 
to increased damages, violated the Seventh Amendment.41  
                                                 
31 U.S. CONST. amend. VII. 
32 Dimick, 293 U.S. 482. 
33 Id. at 476. 
34 Id. at 482. 






41 Id. at 475-476 
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The Court found that “[i]n order to ascertain the scope and 
meaning of the Seventh Amendment, resort must be had to the 
appropriate rules of the common law established at the time of the 
adoption of that constitutional provision in 1791.”42 The Court 
concluded that at English Common Law in 1971, there was “some 
practice . . . in respect of decreasing damages,” but there was no 
similar practice of increasing the amount of damages awarded by a 
jury.43 Thus, the Court held that trial court’s order of additur violated 
the respondent’s right to a trial by jury as guaranteed by the Seventh 
Amendment.44 
Dicta in the majority opinion grudgingly found that the practice of 
remittitur was constitutional under the Seventh Amendment.45 Writing 
for the majority, Justice Sutherland reviewed the history of remittitur 
in the American judicial system.46  Remittitur first appeared in the 
1822 circuit court decision Blunt v. Little.47 There, a jury awarded the 
plaintiff $2,000 in damages for malicious prosecution.48 Finding the 
damages excessive, Justice Story offered the plaintiff an option to 
remit $500 of the damages or submit to a new trial.49 His decision 
rested upon a conclusion that remittitur was commonly practiced at the 
time that the Seventh Amendment was adopted.50 
Commenting on Blunt and subsequent cases, the Dimick Court 
noted it was “remarkable that in none of these cases was there any real 
attempt to ascertain the common-law rule on the subject.”51 In its brief 
analysis of remittitur at English common law, the Dimick Court found 
                                                 
42 Id. at 476 (citing Thompson v. State of Utah, 170 U.S. 343, 350 (1898); 
Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 288 (1930)). 
43 Dimick, 293 U.S. at 482. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. at 484. 




51 Id. at 483. 
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very little evidence to support Justice Story’s proposition that 
remittitur was commonly performed at the time that the Seventh 
Amendment was adoption.52 Rather, the Court stated: 
 
[T]he sole support for the decisions of this court and that of 
Mr. Justice Story, so far as they are pertinent to cases like that 
now in hand, must rest upon the practice of some of the 
English judges—a practice which has been condemned as 
opposed to the principles of the common law by every 
reasoned English decision, both before and after the adoption 
of the Federal Constitution, which [the Court has] been able 
to find.53 
 
Therefore, the Court recognized that the constitutional basis for the 
practice of remittitur was, at best, tenuous.54 Justice Sutherland wrote, 
“it . . . may be that, if the question of remittitur were now before us for 
the first time, it would be decided otherwise.”55 Without the requisite 
historical evidence to support use of remittitur in the American judicial 
system, it seems that the Court’s reasoning in Dimick invites an 
inference that remittitur does not comport with the Seventh 
Amendment.  
Such reasoning conflicts with the court’s ultimate conclusion that 
remittitur is constitutional.56 Despite Justice Sutherland’s hesitance, 
the Court found a basis for the practice of remittitur due to its common 
use in federal courts.57 This conclusion is inconsistent with the Court’s 
emphasis on the importance of the jury as a fact-finding body. It is 
curious that the Court endorsed the practice of remittitur in the same 
decision as it declared trial by jury to be the “normal and preferable 
                                                 
52 Id. 
53 Id. at 484. 
54 Id. at 484-85 
55 Id. 
56 Id. at 482. 
57 Id. at 484-85. 
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mode of disposing of issues of fact.”58 Thus, the Dimick opinion does 
not preclude discussion about the constitutionality of remittitur in the 
federal judicial system. On the contrary, the opinion involved 
conflicting perspectives on the practice of remittitur in federal courts. 
Years later, in Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., the 
Supreme Court considered whether an appellate court’s review of the 
size of a jury verdict violated the Seventh Amendment.59 In that case, 
the petitioner, a journalist, sued the respondent for losing the 
petitioner’s photographic work.60 The petitioner had supplied 300 slide 
transparencies to the respondent for use in an educational videotape.61 
The respondent used 110 of the petitioner’s transparencies but failed to 
return the transparencies after completion of its videotape project.62 
The respondent conceded liability for the lost transparencies, and the 
issue of damages was tried before a jury.63 At trial, the jury awarded 
the petitioner $45,000 in compensatory damages.64  
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit concluded that that the jury award was excessive because it 
“deviat[ed] materially from what would be reasonable 
compensation.”65 Relying on a New York statute that empowered 
appellate courts to review the size of jury verdicts,66 the Second 
Circuit vacated the $45,000 verdict and ordered a new trial, unless the 
petitioner agreed to an award of $100,000.67 The Supreme Court 
granted certiorari to consider whether the Seventh Amendment 
                                                 
58 Id. at 485-86 (“Maintenance of the jury as a fact-finding body is of such 
importance and occupies so firm a place in our history and jurisprudence that any 
seeming curtailment of the right to a jury trial should be scrutinized with the utmost 
care.”). 
59 Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc. 518 U.S. 415 (1996). 




64 Id. at 420. 
65 Id. 
66 N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law and Rules (CPLR) § 5501(c) (McKinney 1995). 
67 Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 421. 
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prohibited a federal appellate court from reviewing the size of a jury 
verdict.68 
In its consideration of the Seventh Amendment’s re-examination 
clause, the Court adopted an evolving interpretation of common law.69 
The Court upheld the appellate court’s use of the “deviates materially” 
standard.70 In so doing, the Court rejected the petitioner’s argument 
that allowing an appellate court to determine excessiveness of 
damages was incompatible with the Seventh Amendment.71  
Dimick and Gasperini make clear that a proper analysis of the 
constitutionality of remittitur under the Seventh Amendment must look 
to the English common law in 1791.72 Dimick and Gasperini diverge, 
however, in the respective approaches taken by the Court towards 
interpreting the common law for the purpose of evaluating an 
excessive damages practice today. In Dimick, the Court adopted a 
static interpretation of the Seventh Amendment that determined its 
scope as within the common law practice of 1791.73 Four dissenting 
justices in Gasperini also maintained this approach.74 However, the 
majority in Gasperini adopted a view of the common law as 
evolving.75 An evolving approach focuses the inquiry on whether an 
excessive damages practice “maintain[s] the role of the jury as fact-
finder, at minimum, as it functioned at English common law in 
1791.”76  
Even under an evolving interpretation of the Seventh Amendment 
adopted by the Court in Gasperini, remittitur does not comport with 
the Seventh Amendment because it “effectively eliminates the 
                                                 
68 Id. at 422. 
69 Suja A. Thomas, Re-Examining the Constitutionality of Remittitur Under the 
Seventh Amendment, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 731, 761 (2003). 
70 Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 417. 
71 Id. 
72 See id. at 446; Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474 (1935). 
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plaintiff’s right to have damages determined by a jury.”77 As discussed 
infra, because the trial option does not present a meaningful choice, an 
order for remittitur forces the plaintiff to “take the judge-remitted 
verdict or settle the case based on the judge’s determination.”78 On the 
question of constitutionality, remittitur fares even worse under a static 
approach to the Seventh Amendment, as adopted by the Court in 
Dimick.79 Lack of historical evidence that remittitur was a common 
English practice in 1791 suggests that remittitur does not comport with 
public policy or a plaintiff’s constitutional guarantee that the “right of 
trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be 
otherwise reexamined in any court of the United States, than according 
to the rules of the common law.”80 
 
SEVENTH CIRCUIT STANDARDS FOR REMITTITUR 
 
A.  Considerations for Determining Whether a Jury Verdict is 
Excessive 
 
The Seventh Circuit determines the appropriateness of remittitur 
based upon several considerations outlined in Thompson v. Memorial 
Hospital of Carbondale.81 In that case, a plaintiff employee sued his 
employer, a hospital, for alleged racial discrimination in violation of 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 42 U.S.C.S. § 1981.82 
The jury ruled in the plaintiff’s favor, and awarded him $500,000.83 
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision 
not to grant a remittitur.84 The court stated that in determining whether 
a verdict for compensatory damages warrants remittitur, a court should 
                                                 
77 Id. at 736. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. at 751. 
80 Id. 
81 Thompson v. Meml. Hosp. of Carbondale, 625 F.3d 394 (7th Cir. 2010). 
82 Id. at 401. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. at 408. 
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look to several factors, including: (1) whether the award is 
“monstrously excessive”; (2) whether there is no rational connection 
between the award and the evidence; and (3) whether the award is 
roughly comparable to awards made in similar cases.85 “A 
monstrously excessive verdict is one that is a ‘product of passion and 
prejudice.’”86 The Seventh Circuit has determined that the 
“monstrously excessive” and “rational connection” factors are “really 
just two ways of describing the same inquiry: whether the jury verdict 
was irrational.”87 
This standard is problematic because it necessarily involves a 
judge’s subjective determination concerning what it means for a 
damages award to be “monstrously excessive.”88 Issues also arise 
when a judge compares damages in cases that are in fact dissimilar.89 
In a civil rights context, compensatory damages are often awarded for 
categories that are difficult to quantify, such as pain and suffering or 
emotional distress. Through the process of remittitur, a trial judge 
“necessarily reexamines facts to determine whether the particular sum 
awarded by the jury in damages is excessive,” thereby violating the 
Seventh Amendment.90 
 
B.  Is the New Trial Option Illusory? 
 
                                                 
85 Id. (citing Marion County Coroner's Office v. E.E.O.C., 612 F.3d 924, 931 
(7th Cir. 2010)). 
86 Adams v. City of Chicago, 798 F.3d 539, 543 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing Fleming 
v. Cty. Of Kane, 898 F. 2d 553, 561 (7th Cir. 2010)). 
87 Adams, 798 F.3d at 543; Harvey v. Office of Banks & Real Estate, 377 F. 3d 
698, 713-14 (7th Cir. 2004); EEOC v. AIC Sec. Investigations, Ltd., 55 F.3d 1276, 
1285 (7th Cir. 1995). 
88 Thomas, supra note 15, at 738.  
89 Id. 
90 William H. Wagner, Procedures to Lessen Remittitur's Intrusion on the 
Seventh Amendment Right to Jury Trial, 1979 Wash. U. L. Q. 639, 643 (1979), 
Available at: http://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1979/iss2/13. 
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An order for remittitur is constitutional only if accompanied by 
the alternative choice of submitting to a new trial.91 This general 
principle governs remittitur in both state and federal courts.92 
However, in many cases the trial option is not viable due to increased 
cost, delay, and risk.93 In her article, Re-Examining the 
Constitutionality of Remittitur Under the Seventh Amendment, Suja A. 
Thomas reports her finding that the trial option is illusory because it 
does not present plaintiffs with a meaningful choice.94 
Thomas conducted a study of the 168 federal district court cases 
reported on Westlaw in which a judge granted remittitur as an 
alternative to a new trial, as of 2003.95 Her findings indicate that a 
plaintiff accepted remittitur in 71% of the cases, and settlement 
occurred in 27% of the cases.96 A plaintiff took the new trial in only 
2% of the cases studied.97 The findings were even more dramatic 
when the pool of cases was narrowed to those that involved “uncertain 
damages,” such as civil rights or emotional distress cases.98 The 
plaintiff accepted the remittitur or settled in 100% of these cases.99 
Thomas’s findings demonstrate that for many plaintiffs, 
exercising the option to a new trial is simply not realistic. She argues 
that even if a second jury awards damages that are similar or higher 
than the first, a plaintiff has “every reason . . . to believe that the judge 
will reduce the damages again,”100 because “[t]he judge who presides 
over the second trial will be the same judge who previously 
                                                 
91 Dimick v. Scheidt, 293 U.S. 474, 482-83 (1934). 
92 Id. 
93 Thomas, supra note 15, at 741-42. 
94 Id. at 740. 
95 Id. at 744 
96 Id. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. at 745. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. at 740. 
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determined the remitted amount was the maximum award under the 
facts.”101  
Further, if a plaintiff refuses to accept damages, he or she is 
unable to appeal the trial court’s order for a new trial after the second 
trail is completed.102 At this point, the plaintiff is likely to have 
incurred significant expenses in costs and attorney’s fees.103 Thus, the 
plaintiff is forced to accept a reduced damages award or settle with 
significantly less bargaining power as a result of the judge’s order for 
remittitur.  
Because an appellate court may be hostile towards a plaintiff who 
refuses to remit his or her damages, remittitur may be seen as a 
“coercive device.”104 “The plaintiff would like to keep his entire 
verdict, but the risk and expense of a new trial are too high . . . the 
plaintiff may reluctantly decide to remit rather than take the chance of 
losing some or all of the remainder in the second trial.”105 Without 
meaningful choice, Thomas’ study makes a strong argument that the 
trial option is illusory.106 Thus, even where present, an order for 
remittitur does not comport with the Seventh Amendment.   
 
THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION IN ADAMS V. CITY OF CHICAGO 
 
In April 2015, the Seventh Circuit decided Adams v. City of 
Chicago.107 Although the Seventh Circuit has a longstanding history of 
support for the remittitur procedure, the plaintiffs in Adams directly 
challenged the constitutionality of remittitur as a violation of their 
rights to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment.108 The Seventh 
Circuit declined to address this facet of the plaintiffs’ claim, stating, “it 
                                                 
101 Id. 
102 Sann, supra note 18, at 311. 
103 Thomas, supra note 15, at 741-42. 
104 Sann, supra note 18, at 312. 
105 Id. 
106 Thomas, supra note 15, at 744. 
107 Adams v. City of Chicago, 798 F.3d 539 (7th Cir. 2015). 
108 Id. at 546. 
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would be bold indeed for a court of appeals to come to such a 
conclusion, given what the Supreme Court has said on the topic.”109 
The Seventh Circuit’s decision presents an opportunity to re-examine 
Supreme Court doctrine regarding remittitur, and specifically to 
address the ramifications of remittitur in civil rights cases. 
 
A.  Facts 
 
At approximately 8:00 p.m. on September 14, 2004, Seneca 
Adams was arrested by Chicago police officers.110 Seneca was stopped 
while jogging through the apartment complex where he lived with his 
twin sister, Sicara Adams.111 The officers shouted racial slurs at 
Seneca, pointed their pistols at him, and punched him in the face 
several times in front of Seneca’s family and other spectators.112 When 
the officers drove Seneca away from the apartment complex, Seneca’s 
sister, Sicara, and brother, Tari Adams, decided to follow in Tari’s 
car.113  
At a secluded location, the police officers continued to beat 
Seneca.114 When the officers realized that they had been followed, a 
police officer punched Tari in the face.115 Sicara and Tari attempted to 
leave the scene but were followed by a police car that slammed into 
the driver’s side of Tari’s car.116 Tari was arrested and beaten as he 
tried to exit his car.117  
                                                 
109 Id. 
110 Adams v. City of Chicago, 62 F. Supp. 3d 771, 773-74 (N.D. Ill. 2014), 
vacated and remanded, 798 F.3d 539 (7th Cir. 2015). 
111 Id. 
112 Id. 
113 Id. at 774. 
114 Id. 
115 Id. 
116 Id. at 775 
117 Id. 
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Eventually, both brothers were taken to a local hospital.118 Seneca 
was charged with four counts of aggravated battery and unlawful use 
of a deadly weapon.119 Tari was charged with four counts of 
aggravated assault and two counts of aggravated battery.120 Both were 
found guilty of misdemeanors at a bench trial in the Circuit Court of 
Cook County.121 The brothers remained in the custody of the Cook 
County Jail for 204 days, and 46 days, respectively.122 However, on 
December 19, 2006, the charges against Seneca and Tari were vacated 
and their records were expunged.123 
The brothers sued the City of Chicago and individual police 
officers as a result of the vicious beatings and prolonged detentions 
that they were forced to endure.124 They filed a complaint in federal 
court, invoking federal question jurisdiction for their claims under 42 
U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 and supplemental jurisdiction for their state 
law claims.125 The City agreed to admit liability to both Seneca and 
Tari Adams for (1) false arrest, in violation of the Fourth Amendment; 
(2) excessive force, in violation of the Fourth Amendment; (3) 
discrimination on the basis of race, in violation of the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; and (4) malicious prosecution, 
in violation of Illinois state law.126 In exchange, the brothers dropped 
their claims against the individual officers.127  
 
B.  The District Court’s Holding 
 






123 Id. at 776. 
124 Id. 
125 Id. 
126 Id. at 776-77. 
127 Id. at 777. 
16
Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 11, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 4
http://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol11/iss2/4
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                       Volume 11, Issue 2                        Spring 2016 
 
190 
The case proceeded to a jury trial on compensatory damages 
against the City on February 18, 2014, wherein the jury awarded 
Seneca $2,400,000 and Tari $1,000,000 in damages.128 At this point, 
however, something unexpected happened; the district court entered an 
order for remittitur, reducing each award to $1,170,000 and $350,000, 
respectively.129 The brothers were forced to accept this reduction, as 
they were not offered the option of a new trial.130 They appealed this 
order to the Seventh Circuit.131 
 
C.  The Seventh Circuit’s Holding  
 
Seneca and Tari argued that the district court’s order of remittitur 
should be vacated because it violated their Seventh Amendment right 
to a jury trial.132 They relied heavily upon the scholarship of Suja A. 
Thomas, in which she proposes that the United States Supreme Court 
has never directly addressed the constitutionality of remittitur, and that 
in fact its interpretation of the Seventh Amendment as related to the 
unconstitutionality of additur disfavors use of remittitur as well.133 
Although the Seventh Circuit held in the Adams brothers’ favor, it 
dismissed this argument based upon the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Dimick and others.134 
In its opinion, the Seventh Circuit first addressed why the 
plaintiffs had appellate jurisdiction in this case. The court recognized 
that generally, “a plaintiff who accepts a reduced award may not 
appeal from the court’s decision to cut back on the jury’s verdict.”135 
Based upon this rule, the City argued that because the Adams brothers 
accepted their reduced damages, they could not appeal the district 
                                                 
128 Adams v. City of Chicago, 798 F.3d 539, 541 (7th Cir. 2015). 
129 Id. 
130 Id. at 542. 
131 Id. at 541. 
132 Id. 
133 Thomas, supra note 15, at 738. 
134 Adams, 798 F.3d at 546. 
135 Id. at 541. 
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court’s order of remittitur. However, the Seventh Circuit recognized 
that appellate jurisdiction was secure because the Adams brothers were 
never offered the option of a new trial, as a “true remittitur order” 
requires.136 Once jurisdiction was decided, the question in the case 
became what to do about the district court’s failure to provide the 
Adams brothers with this option.137 
The Adams brothers asked the Court to reinstate the jury verdict, 
while the City argued that the Adams brothers should not be allowed 
to skip the step of having to choose between reduced damages and a 
new trial.138 Thus, the Seventh Circuit turned to an excessive damages 
test. The test involves three factors, including: “whether (1) the award 
is monstrously excessive; (2) there is no rational connection between 
the award and the evidence, indicating that it is merely a product of the 
jury's fevered imaginings or personal vendettas; and (3) whether the 
award is roughly comparable to awards made in similar cases.”139  
The Seventh Circuit’s application of this test demonstrates the 
level to which an order for remittitur is a subjective determination, 
particularly in civil rights cases: “We have observed that the 
‘monstrously excessive’ standard and the ‘rational connection’ 
standard are really just two ways of describing the same inquiry: 
whether the jury verdict was irrational.”140 In deciding a matter of fact, 
remittitur effectively allows a judge’s subjective determination to 
replace that of the jury’s, even where, as here, it cannot be 
demonstrated that the judge is better equipped to make such a 
determination. The Seventh Circuit further analogized the jury verdict 
to the damages awards in past decisions, finding that the original 
$2,400,000 awarded to Seneca and $1,000,000 awarded to Tari did not 
                                                 
136 Id. 
137 Id. at 542. 
138 Id. 
139 Id. at 543 (citing G.G. v. Grindle, 665 F.3d 795, 798 (7th Cir. 2011)). 
140 Id. (citing Harvey v. Office of Banks & Real Estate, 377 F.3d 698, 713–14 
(7th Cir. 2004)); EEOC v. AIC Sec. Investigations, Ltd., 55 F.3d 1276, 1285 n. 13 
(7th Cir. 1995).  
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deviate greatly from other similar cases.141 In doing so, the Seventh 
Circuit again represented why this type of standard may cause 
inaccuracies: “The problem, well illustrated by the briefs in this case, 
is that one can always find excessive force cases with verdicts at 
different levels.”142 In discussing previous cases, the Seventh Circuit 
admitted that this type of evidence is “anecdotal . . . at best.”143 
Despite its recognition of the problems associated with the 
“monstrously excessive” standard, the Seventh Circuit declined to 
consider Plaintiffs’ argument that the practice of remittitur itself 
violates the Seventh Amendment.144 The Seventh Circuit’s opinion 
inaccurately interpreted Justice Steven’s opinion in Gebser v. Lago 
Vista Independent School District145 and the majority opinion in 
Dimick146 as directly addressing, and affirming, the constitutionality of 
remittitur. 
 
D.  The Adams Brothers’ Seventh Amendment Argument 
 
In addition to arguments more specific to their case, the Adams 
brothers asserted that the order of remittitur was unconstitutional 
because it violated their right to a jury trial under the Seventh 
Amendment.147 Relying on the scholarship of Suja A. Thomas, the 
brothers argued that damages are a question of fact, properly 
determined by the jury, which cannot be supplanted by a judge’s 
personal opinion.148 Their argument called into question current 
standards for determining whether remittitur is unconstitutional as 
                                                 
141 Id. 
142 Id. at 545. 
143 Id. 
144 Id. at 546 (“We cannot resist observing, however, that it would be bold 
indeed for a court of appeals to come to such a conclusion, given what the Supreme 
Court has said on the topic”). 
145 Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274 (1998). 
146 Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474 (1935). 
147 Adams, 798 F.3d at 546. 
148 Id. 
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inapplicable and inappropriate to cases that involve determination of 
“uncertain damages,” such as civil rights cases.149 For example, the 
reasoning advanced by the Adams brothers involved the ancillary 
assumption that remittitur is unconstitutional because in most cases the 
option for a new trial is illusory.150 Thus, even if this option had been 
provided to them, the remittitur order would not have been sufficient 
to pass constitutional muster under the Seventh Amendment. 
At common law, review of judgments was limited to questions of 
law, not fact.151 The Adams brothers advanced a simple and 
straightforward argument: the trial judge should not have been 
permitted to supplant the jury verdict with his own opinion.152 They 
asked that the Seventh Circuit vacate the district court’s remittitur and 
order it to reinstate the initial jury verdict.153 
In Gasperini, the Supreme Court cited a Second Circuit opinion: 
“We must give the benefit of every doubt to the judgment of the trial 
judge; but surely there must be an upper limit, and whether that has 
been surpassed is not a question of fact with respect to which 
reasonable men may differ, but a question of law.”154 This principle 
served as the foundation of the City of Chicago’s case. The City 
claimed that the district court did not err in its order of remittitur 
because the damages awarded to Seneca and Tari were so excessive as 
to present a question of law for the district court judge.155  
However, counsel for the Adams brothers disputed the application 
of the same principle here, and to other civil rights cases involving 
                                                 
149 Id. 
150 Id. 
151 Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 452 (1996) (“The writ 
of error only lies upon matter of law arising upon the face of the proceedings; so that 
no evidence is required to substantiate or support it”) (internal citations omitted). 
152 Reply Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 13, Adams v. City of Chicago, 798 
F.3d 593 (7th Cir. 2015) (No. 14-2862), 2015 WL 1020418. 
153 Adams v. City of Chicago, 798 F.3d 539, 542 (7th Cir. 2015). 
154 Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 435 (quoting Dagnello v. Long Island R. Co., 289 
F.2d 797, 806 (2d Cir., 1961)). 
155  Reply Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants, supra note 157, at 14. 
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“uncertain damages” in general.156 The reply brief for Seneca and Tari 
Adams distinguishes Gasperini as a case in which the Supreme Court 
“was analyzing hard numbers, an excess of which could arguably been 
seen as unlawfully excessive.”157 In Gasperini, the Supreme Court 
considered a breach of contract case.158 There, the defendant-appellee 
lost transparency slides belonging to a photographer and was thus 
unable to follow through on his agreement that the slides would be 
given back to the photographer upon completion of the project for 
which they were needed.159 Unlike the emotional and psychological 
damages involved in Adams, Gasperini considered only measurable 
damages related to the value of the lost transparencies.160  
Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion in Gasperini touches upon the 
injustice that results from the failure to make such a distinction.161 
Concerned that the Gasperini holding would allow courts to reduce 
jury verdicts without tangible evidence of the jury’s unlawfulness, 
Justice Scalia turned to the purpose of the Seventh Amendment.162 He 
stated:  
 
There is no small irony in the Court's declaration today that 
appellate review of refusals to grant new trials for error of 
fact is ‘a control necessary and proper to the fair 
administration of justice.’ It is objections to precisely that sort 
of “control” by federal appellate judges that gave birth to the 
Reexamination Clause of the Seventh Amendment.163 
 
Within the spirit of Justice Scalia’s argument is the Adams brothers’ 
argument that reduction of jury damages in a civil rights case without 
                                                 
156 Id. 
157 Id. 
158 Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 419. 
159 Id. 
160 Id. 
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tangible evidence of the jury’s unlawfulness subverts the meaning and 
purpose of the Seventh Amendment. 
Additionally, the Seventh Circuit in Adams lamented the 
imperfect application of the excessive damages standard to “uncertain” 
damages cases, in which a subjective determination must be made 
regarding damages as opposed to a number that may be generated by a 
formula.164 The Seventh Circuit stated that comparisons “amount to 
anecdotal evidence at best.”165 Nevertheless, the court compared 
Adams to other excessive force cases in which compensatory damages 
were awarded.166 
Therefore, the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Adams brings to the 
fore concerns about whether a judge may determine that a damages 
award in any civil rights case is truly excessive and thus warrants a 
remittitur order. It seems that Justice Scalia’s concern that a jury 
verdict should not be remitted without sufficient evidence of the jury’s 
unlawfulness has manifested itself in this case.167 The Seventh 
Circuit’s opinion describes no evidence of legal error, mistake in jury 
instruction, or statutory cap on the damages permitted at the trial court 
level in this case. Indeed, current standards for remittitur that ask a 
court to determine whether a damages award is “monstrously 
excessive” by observing whether it is roughly comparable to other, 
“similar” cases necessarily permit a judge to supplant the jury’s 
determination with a subjective, “uncertain,” determination of his or 
her own. This simply cannot be supported, as it goes against the rights 
and privileges afforded a plaintiff by the Seventh Amendment. 
Finally, Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion in Gasperini is 
instructive as to the Court’s error in finding a basis for the practice of 
remittitur solely in its longterm practice by federal courts.168 
Critiquing the majority decision that permitted an appellate court to 
review the size of jury verdicts, Justice Scalia stated:  
                                                 
164 Adams v. City of Chicago, 798 F.3d 539, 545 (7th Cir. 2015). 
165 Id. 
166 Id. 
167 See Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 448-49 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
168 Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 448-49 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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Today, the Court overrules a longstanding and well-reasoned 
line of precedent . . . One reason is given for overruling these 
cases: that the Courts of Appeals have, for some time now, 
decided to ignore them. Such unreasoned capitulation to the 
nullification of what was long regarded as a core component 
of the Bill of Rights- the Seventh Amendment’s prohibition 
on appellate reexamination of civil jury awards- is wrong.169  
 
Although the facts of Gasperini differ from use of remittitur in Adams, 
Justice Scalia’s assertion is equally applicable to reductions in 
damages ordered by trial judges. A court should not be permitted to 
circumvent the requirements of the Seventh Amendment simply 
because courts have done so before. This harm is likely to occur in 
“uncertain” damages situations, including cases that involve damages 
incurred by police brutality. In this context especially, an order of 
remittitur is unconstitutional unless substantiated by concrete evidence 
related to mistake in jury instruction, a damages award that exceeds 




In order to provide a true legal remedy to victims of police 
brutality, courts must abandon the procedural obstacles that prohibit 
civil rights plaintiffs from obtaining justice. While dicta found in the 
Supreme Court’s decision Dimick suggests that a constitutional basis 
for remittitur may be found in its long-term practice by federal courts, 
the Court’s reasoning failed to analyze remittitur in depth.170 In light 
of the fact that little evidence can be found of a historical practice of 
remittitur in English common law in 1871, remittitur falls beyond the 
scope of the Seventh Amendment’s guarantee of a jury trial.171 
Although the Seventh Circuit reversed the order of remittitur in 
                                                 
169 Id. 
170 Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 484 (1935). 
171 Id. 
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Adams, by neglecting to consider the plaintiff’s Seventh Amendment 
argument, the Seventh Circuit failed to issue a decision that would 
prevent similar harm to future victims of police brutality.172 The 
Adams decision illustrates the tension between remittitur orders and 
the Seventh Amendment. 
Specifically in the context of cases involving “uncertain” damages 
such as compensation for pain and suffering, a trial judge’s 
determination that these damages are “excessive” as a matter of law 
necessarily involves his or her reexamination of the facts.173 The 
“monstrously excessive” standard in use by the Seventh Circuit to 
determine whether a jury verdict is excessive is unclear, and invites 
the trial judge’s subjective determination about the size of an 
acceptable damages award to supplant the determination of the jury. 
Further, the trial option presented to plaintiffs as an alternative to 
reduced damages is illusory.174 Due to the increased cost, delay, and 
risk of loss associated with a new trial, plaintiffs rarely exercise the 
trial option when presented with an order for remittitur.175 In addition, 
an appellate court may look unfavorably upon a plaintiff who refuses 
to remit his or her damages.176 Therefore, the trial option does not 
present a meaningful choice, but, rather, coerces a plaintiff to accept 
reduced damages lest he or she lose the full sum at a new trial. 
While the procedure of remittitur has thus far escaped public 
attention, it provides a significant obstacle for victims of police 
brutality and other “uncertain” damages that seek justice in court. 
Remittitur serves no constitutional or public policy interest in civil 
rights cases. Therefore, in cases in which a plaintiff sues for violation 
of his or her civil rights, courts must abandon the practice of remittitur 
in order to facilitate justice. 
 
 
                                                 
172 Adams v. City of Chicago, 798 F.3d 546 (7th Cir. 2015). 
173 Wagner, supra note 89, at 643. 
174 Thomas, supra note 15, at 741-42.  
175 Id. 
176 Sann, supra note 18, at 312.  
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